INTRODUCTION
The slowdown of economic growth, together with high financial leverage of the Chinese economy, are topics of much debate among macroeconomists in business and academia. In combination, these developments point to the presence of financial risks in China. Given the significant role of China in the world economy, the materialization of financial risks in this country may spread to the world economy and hit hard global financial markets.
The economic growth in China reached its lowest rate of 6.7% in 2016, and it is likely that it will not return to two digit rates in the foreseeable future. Lower economic growth rates will not necessarily lead to a financial crisis, but can aggravate existing financial risks. For example, a decrease in economic growth can negatively affect the financial stability of individual companies and financial institutions. Low growth rates can also affect asset prices, for instance, in the real estate market, causing defaults on mortgages.
Several risks have been identified in the literature as possible threats for financial stability in China. The first threat is a high leverage and the large amount of nonperforming loans in the corporate sector (e.g. Lipton (2016) , Zhang et al. (2015) , and Roberts and Zurawski (2016) ), especially in heavy industries and state-owned companies that were one of the key sources of economic growth in China over the last three decades. Chinese authorities distributed vast resources to such industries in the form of credits and investments. However, because of a decrease in the marginal return on capital, the growth of real wages, and the export growth slowdown, these industries currently face problems with debt repayment. Credit financing of these industries was mainly provided through the financial repression policy, under which the Chinese government regulates the spread between credit and deposit interest rates. This allowed Chinese companies to take credits at a low interest rate. Moreover, the main banks in the Chinese banking system are state-owned, so they can potentially provide credits to companies according to the government's instructions.
The second threat to financial stability in China is the extensive growth of shadow banking (e.g. Liang (2016), Liu et al. (2016) , Jie and Yang (2015) ). The development of shadow banking in China was also caused mainly by financial repression policy. The limitations on credit interest rates stimulated banks in China to create alternative methods of funding borrowers, such as trusts, funds, and wealth management products. These instruments allow banks to provide funds to clients at high interest rates. According to data from the Global Shadow Banking Monitoring Report 2015, China made the largest contribution in the world to the growth of the global shadow banking sector in 2015.
The third threat originates from the real estate market risks (e.g. Zhang et al. 
ECONOMETRIC FRAMEWORK

Systemic risk measure
The preliminary stage in our econometric framework is the construction of a systemic risk measure based on CDS and interbank market data. This systemic risk measure is used in further analysis as a proxy variable for the level of systemic risk in the Chinese economy. CDS and interbank market data for computation were selected for two reasons. First, market-based systemic risk measures can be calculated in real time without an accounting lag, therefore they respond faster to unexpected events than systemic risk measures that are based on non-market data. A feature of the Chinese financial system is the state ownership of the main financial institutions. Because of implicit government guarantees to the main financial institutions, the probability of their default will highly depend on the probability of the government default. So the financial system risk premium in equation (1) will not fully take into account such a risk. Moreover, for emerging markets, the country-specific risk can be an important source of systemic risk. Taking into consideration mentioned reasons, the systemic risk measure for the Chinese economy is calculated as follows:
Systemic risk measure (SRM) = financial system risk premium
Where 'sovereign default risk premium' is 1-year sovereign CDS spread. 
Dynamic Factor Model and Factor-Augmented Quantile Regressions
In our analysis, we assume that the dynamics of the systemic risk measure is explained by the following dynamic factor model (DF model):
Where is the matrix of observed time series at quarter , is the matrix of several identified latent factors (we use two factors), is the value of the systemic risk measure at quarter , are matrices of estimated unknown parameters, and are idiosyncratic error terms.
The DF model has two important advantages in comparison with other types of systemic risk models. First, it can simultaneously take into account the effect of many important macroeconomic factors on systemic risk in China, such as the growth slowdown, large corporate debt, the rise of shadow banking, and the real estate market (5) as follows:
where is the VaR of the systemic risk measure at the probability level. De Nicolo and Lucchetta (2017) show that quantile regressions estimate systemic tail risks better than an ordinary regression or a GARCH model.
DATA AND ESTIMATION
The distinctive feature of our analysis is the choice of data for the estimation of 
Financial fragility and an early warning indicator
In this section, we analyze the financial fragility in the Chinese economy, measuring the VaR of the systemic risk measureWe also discuss how the forecast of the DF model and can be used together as an early-warning indicator for financial crisis in China.
By construction, shows possible values for the systemic risk measure in the case of rare and unexpected negative shocks to financial stability, when several financial institutions can default. Thus, significantly correlates with the probability of financial institutions' default in a crisis time. In other words, it can be a good proxy for the level of fragility of the Chinese financial system. If grows, the financial system will be more fragile in the case of negative shocks and vice versa. 2. The DF model should predict growth in the systemic risk measure. 
